“Urgent” Trial Adjourned To January 2027 After DPP’s Key Witness Leaves The Island

By Alric Lindsay

A trial listed as a priority in the Summary Court today, July 24, 2026, could not go ahead after the key witness for the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was found to be off the island, leaving the defendant – already subject to a 24-hour curfew – facing a wait until January 2027 before his case is heard.

The defendant appeared before Magistrate Murray charged with breaching a protection order. The allegation, as it emerged in argument, turns on a single question: whether the defendant came within a set distance of a house he was ordered to stay away from.

Explaining the reason for an adjournment of the priority trial, DPP Crown Counsel said that one witness – described as the one who “goes to the heart of the Crown’s case” – had indicated, when served with her summons, that she would be away from the Cayman Islands until next week. Therefore, DPP required more time so that the witness could return to give her evidence.

Defence counsel Amelia Fosuhene objected to the case being taken off. She pressed the point that her client’s circumstances made delay serious: he was subject to strict conditions confining him to his home save for court and medical appointments, and the matter was also affecting his ability to see his child.

In addition to this objection, questions were raised about the timing and date of the summons, and suggested that DPP Crown Counsel should give witnesses proper notice so that they can inform DPP Crown Counsel of any issues in advance.

DPP Crown Counsel replied that the summons was prepared on July 10 and sent to the courts on July 16, saying that there had been no delay on the Crown’s part – the witness’s unavailability came to light only when the summons was served.

Magistrate Murray weighed the two interests openly. On one side, the restrictions on a defendant who has been convicted of nothing; on the other, the public interest in a priority matter being “fully ventilated as soon as possible so that a determination can be made as to where the truth may lie”.

The magistrate began from a clear starting point: “the starting point when a matter is sent for trial is that trial should proceed,” and it must be “a very reasonable and tangible explanation as to why it cannot proceed.”

Applying that test, the magistrate found the explanation sufficient. The witness “is not purposefully making herself unavailable”; she had not been present when the trial date was set and so could not have flagged the conflict; and the Crown had acted “with due haste” in preparing the summons. On that basis the magistrate acceded to the Crown’s request for a new date.

The cost of the delay

The consequence was stark, and the defence counsel did not disguise it. Defence counsel told the court she had no availability until January 2027 – the court having begun listing her matters from that week – so a new trial date could not realistically be found before then. From July 2026, that is a wait of some five months.

Against that background, defence counsel applied to vary her client’s conditions. He was, she said, subject to a 24-hour curfew, already enforced by an electronic monitor with geofencing that alerts if he leaves the premises. She asked the court to relax the curfew so that he was not “sitting in a house confined to a house for the next” five months, and could seek employment.

DPP Crown counsel did not oppose the application, describing it as not unreasonable and noting the defendant remained subject to electronic monitoring throughout.

Magistrate Murray granted the variation, replacing the existing curfew with one running from 6pm to 6am – leaving the defendant free during the day, subject to the monitor, and able to look for work.

What happens next

The magistrate declined to fix a trial date on the spot, instead returning the matter to the case-management list. Regarding this, defence counsel noted that her avilability could change, but that would depend on whether another trial in the Grand Court list collapses.

The magistrate described the issue as “a very narrow” one – “Was he or was he not within 100 metres?” – and agreed it was not a complex matter, which sharpened the cconcern about a five-month wait to resolve it.

Note to readers

Magistrates typically order “urgent” or priority trials when they involve young defendants, and cases where there are vulnerable or young witnesses.

According to the court’s Practice Direction no. 1 of 2022, In R v Barker [2010] WWCA Crim 4, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales highlighted “the importance to the trial and investigative process of keeping any delay in a case involving a child complainant to an irreducible minimum.”